Month: June 2026
education v. indoctrination
Education builds bridges to new understanding. (educare: to bring up; to nurture). Indoctrination burns bridges and prevents new ones from being built. (endoctriner: to instruct; to imbue with an idea or opinion). Education makes the world bigger. Indoctrination keeps one sequestered in a silo.

The reason anti-woke folks rail so hard against indoctrination is that they were shaped by indoctrination that was presented as education; and in the absence of actual education, it’s easy to conflate the two, or confuse one for the other. Their impulse to resist indoctrination is sound. The target of their ire is misplaced.
The people who built these systems often believed in them completely—which is exactly what makes indoctrination so effective. You don’t need cynics at the top. You need true believers who’ve never crossed the bridge themselves.
That’s how the confusion between indoctrination and education perpetuates itself—not through deception, but through unexamined inheritance.
‘woke’ just means ‘educated, and ready to cross the bridge when it presents itself.’
‘anti-woke’ just means ‘bridges are dangerous: it’s only safe in the silo.’
Good for you, for recognizing the importance of education, and the power of indoctrination to limit education’s reach. If you’re sitting with the anxiety of a world widened beyond the scale of what you were prescribed, just reach out. Folks are here for you—just over the bridge.
on wokeness, and its opposite
to be woke is to have a visceral sense of justice, as reliable as the senses of sight, hearing, smell, touch, taste, and cognition—that allows one to recognize that the current language of justice is inadequate, as justice is not applied equitably across all who would access it; and to participate in creating language that leads to equitable application.

to be a woke ally is to recognize that one lacks the visceral sense of justice; to believe those who experience it; and to use the other senses to fill the gap, trusting that the language will mature if allowed to do so—to be blind, but willing to coexist with the sighted.
to be anti-woke is to deny the existence of the visceral experience of justice; to belittle those who would enrich its language—to be blind, to deny the existence of sight, in the most literal sense, and to refuse to coexist with the sighted.
only a person who has had the sense of justice bred out of them can own humans or force them through contract into unpaid labor; deny them equal access to the right to vote; justify and continue to fund genocide; or accumulate wealth while others starve.
knowing that the path of the ally is available, one follows it to redemption.
never suspecting that justice is lived experience, the whole world becomes one’s adversary.
are redheads sun-drenched brunettes, or spicy blondes?
I recently received pushback from the usual channels when I posted about decolonizing the gender binary. As is my way, I went looking to history to see if I was being unfair to white guys. What I found was pretty clear, and it’s not just related to race (like gender, a relational construct), but more about power.

Gender flexibility tends to appear in cultures where gender is understood as a relational/functional/spiritual category rather than a biological one. The binary hardened historically where:
- Roman law codified sex/gender into property and inheritance structures: strict gender roles ensure that only certain people are eligible to pass along the family name, and that eligibility is determined by the accidental conditions of one’s birth, framed as divine right—the same power structure that legitimized the emperor.
- Abrahamic traditions systematized binary creation theology: by encoding the male/female pair as the first and foundational act of divine sorting, the binary was lifted out of social negotiation and into ontology—it became not a human arrangement subject to revision but a feature of reality itself, which meant that any person who didn’t fit wasn’t merely unusual but was an offense against the created order, converting natural human variation into theological emergency.
- Colonial administration required legible, fixed categories for population management: census-taking, taxation, land assignment, and conscription all demanded that bodies be sortable into stable, enumerable units—and a population with fluid gender categories resisted that enumeration, making it ungovernable by the ledger’s logic, which is why colonial law didn’t merely discourage gender variance but criminalized it, converting a bureaucratic convenience into a moral imperative.
- Industrial capitalism needs stable labor and domestic role assignments: the factory and the household have to be administered as separate spheres with non-overlapping populations, because the system’s profitability depended on reproductive and household labor remaining unwaged. Enter binary gender roles, enforced at the level of law, medicine, and social shame simultaneously.
Each of these systems borrowed legitimacy from the one before it, passing the same externalization cost forward in an unbroken chain.
What’s lost if we only recognize the one narrative? We miss that the relational/functional/spiritual frame for gender is much older than the biological one—many traditions that include multiple genders are thousands of years old. The binary as a rigid universal is, relatively speaking, a recent and geographically specific imposition.
And in many countries around the world where gender and sexual binaries are strictly enforced after the supposed retreat of colonialism, it’s not a return to some older tradition. Many of the countries with the most prescriptive gender codes had some of the most complex and dynamic relationships to gender in pre-colonial times: they are literally continuing to do the colonizers’ work. It turns out that the gender binary’s effectiveness as a sorting mechanism is often seen as more important than recognizing a history that embraces human variation.
So yeah, it’s looking like mostly white guys. I look enough like a white guy that I don’t have any trouble pointing out this information. My inner white guy can handle it. I choose to transcend the binary. How? Understand the history of the sorting mechanism, and for whose comfort it was designed—and then decide whether your discomfort with dismantling it is really yours, or just the mechanism doing its job.
oh, california
as a practicing buddhist, “leave no trace” is a guiding principle embedded into every teaching: leave no physical trace of your passage through the busy world, and leave no stinky teaching behind that muddies the waters of the dharma.

how do we practice this, living as we do with the legacy of colonialism, cultural appropriation, and industrial capitalism? do i join a monastery that maintains a culture derived from practices developed thousands of miles away within a separate but equally asymmetrical power structure as medieval Japan?
maybe—but what other options are there?
considering that i was born and raised in California, what models for living are available for living a leave-no-trace lifestyle in this place?
Let’s consider a moment like this.
dōgen, the go-to teacher in my particular subsect of zen buddhism, the Sōto school, was sharing his wisdom from a temple in a remote area of Echizen province in Japan in the 13th century. consider what was happening in California at that time.
California was arguably one of the most linguistically and culturally diverse regions in the world. people had lived here for millennia, and by 1500CE (3 centuries after Dōgen’s birth), there were somewhere around 80 distinct languages and cultural groups living in this place: in the coastal region; in the great valley between the coastal ranges and the Sierra Nevada; in myriad river valleys, watersheds, grasslands, and oak groves.
Consider this: upon arrival, on ships and overland, European colonists encountered a land that they believed to be pristine and uninhabited.
Let that sink in.
One of the most culturally diverse regions on Earth.
For anyone paying mindful attention (as we are entreated to do), this would seem to provide a textbook example of “leave-no-trace.” Look around. Where are the crumbling monuments and scorched places that a region with 80 distinct cultures would be expected to contain?
If you have the capacity to think about this for even a moment, it is likely to be almost unimaginable.
that being said, it would be inaccurate and unfair to say that the people who inhabited this place left no trace—on the contrary, the traces are there, if one knows where to look.
Let’s consider the traces left behind, in California, by the 80 or so distinct cultures that inhabited this place for millennia, before the ships came.
They left behind fire-shaped oak woodlands, park-like oak savannas with open understories, that early European observers admired and assumed were natural. They were natural, but they were also made—through precise, seasonally timed cultural burning that suppressed encroaching conifers, stimulated acorn production, and maintained the grassland-woodland mosaic that supported enormous biodiversity.
They left behind a superabundance of large game. The astonishing density of elk, deer, and pronghorn reported by early contact-era observers was not an accident of wilderness conditions—it was the managed outcome of burn regimens, selective harvest, and spiritual protocols around killing that functioned as de facto conservation law.
They left behind salmon run integrity—weir systems, harvest techniques, and first-catch ceremonies functioned together as a distributed watershed management system. The ceremonies were societal self-regulation—embedding catch limits and seasonal closures as cultural touchstones.
We knock on doors to ask for candy. They practiced similar rituals to ensure next season’s catch.
they left behind camas and brodaea meadows. These extensive bulb plantings, which fed both humans and animals across enormous areas, were cultivated through selective harvest, replanting, and burning. Europeans saw them as wildflower meadows—they were cultivated gardens in disguise.
Leave no trace, indeed.
They left behind tarweed and clover patches, in distinct patterns. Intentional burning created a patchwork of early-succession forb communities across hillsides—maximizing seed yield while simultaneously creating the habitat that makes species diversity possible. The quilt pattern that Europeans noticed in the landscape was an agricultural design, cultivated by people with intention and systems wisdom.
They left behind a near-universal network of dense, structurally complex riparian zones—willows, alders, sedges. These corridors were the circulatory system of the landscape, and they were kept open and healthy by people who understood the value of stewardship and systems thinking to their lifeways.
They left behind shell midden topography: shellmounds are found along the Bay, the coast, the rivers. They are features of the landscape now, that support unique alkaline plant communities. These indigenous communities had their landfills, but what they leave behind is kind of an accidental monument to valuable plant species that grow nowhere else.
They left behind stands of elderberry and hazel. Both were actively managed—elderberry for food and medicine, hazel for basket-making. Their distribution across the landscape reflects human intention. Where you find dense hazel stands, you are standing in someone’s workshop—again, disguised as natural selection.
They also left behind absence: absence of erosion signatures in pre-contact sediment cores. Paleoecological cores from California lakes and estuaries show remarkably stable sediment profiles through the pre-contact period—low erosion, stable watersheds, consistent organic input. In contrast, the colonial period shows up as an abrupt, catastrophic sediment disruption. These 80 cultures left behind measurable stability in the geological record. The entrance of Europeans is literally visible at the sedimentary level.
They left behind black, carbon-rich soils in valley and foothill community sites—soils darkened and enriched by millennia of habitation, burning, composting, and refuse incorporation. These patches grow differently than surrounding soils. Farmers and gardeners notice them. They are slowly-accumulated signatures of long residence—in the best way: they continue to support biodiversity and utility to the stewards who tend them.
Landscape. Systems. People. Intention. All working together for millennia. 80 distinct cultures.
Europeans arrive and see nothing but a natural landscape.
I’m saying this over and over again because it’s so easy to gloss over if you don’t make the effort to consider the alternative.
What is the alternative?
Let’s consider the legacy left behind by the people on ships (and overland) who saw a pristine place and sought to save the inhabitants from their sins.
If we consider the legacy of a supposedly civilized people;
and if we consider that what was left behind was left behind by a diversity of peoples whose numbers were diminished by 95% within 150 years of contact with the (supposed) savior peoples whose numbers arrived on ships (and overland);
what would be the legacy of the people who intervened in the millennia-long experiment of California’s indigenous peoples?
Let’s consider the legacy of an intervening people, if their numbers were suddenly diminished by 95%. Let’s consider (if we consider the intervening people to be more civilized) what we would expect to have found:
(I hope fellow buddhists are practicing mindfulness here)
Where are the prisons? The structures whose purpose is the forcible removal of human beings from the social body, if we assume that such removal is a necessary function of civilization? No pre-contact California culture is known to have required one. This begs the question: what kind of society needs this many cages?
Where are the parking lots? Surely an ecosystem that supports 80 different cultures must require an impermeable surface with zero ecological function, and a thermal mass that raises ambient temperature, that exceeds the footprint of habitable buildings, to carry out its work of saving a population from their sins. Surely they would have needed a warehouse for their means of travel.
Where are the landfills? We found shellmounds that became soil, ecology, and monument in one. What about their accumulated poisons, leachates, methane—sealed from the biological processes that would otherwise transform them?
Where are the strip malls—the commercial vernacular of a healthy market economy—built for a lifespan of 30 years, and already obsolescing before completion? We don’t see the parking lots (larger than the buildings themselves), but surely we would see some signs of commerce.
Where are the stadiums—the enormous structures used for roughly 20 days per year, built with public money, named for corporations, demolished when the team demands a newer one? The Romans had their amphitheater, that was apparently well-used—where did these people display their spectacle?
Where are the hospitals? is it possible that these people did not allow their baseline conditions—diet, air, water, social cohesion, meaningful work—to degrade so severely that industrial-scale intervention became necessary to sustain normal human function? Did they not live in such a way that made such monuments to care necessary?
Where are the highways? Roman roads are still visible from satellites. American interstates will be legible to geologists a millennium from now. Impermeable, like parking lots, severing watersheds, fragmenting habitat, producing runoff laced with tire particulate that is now measurable in the tissues of Pacific salmon. Surely civilized people would have needed a structure to move vehicles between parking lots, no?
Where are the golf courses? Doesn’t a civilized culture need a chemically maintained monoculture on land that could support hundreds of species, with water consumption needs on an agricultural scale—poisoned earth, to support a certain shade of turf, for the leisure of a few?
Where is the advertising infrastructure: billboards, signage, the entire visual apparatus of commercial persuasion permanently installed in the landscape? How would people have known what products to purchase to maintain legibility as citizens and support the corporate infrastructure?
Where are the Superfund sites? Certainly, a section of the continent that was home to 80 distinct cultures would have needed places where industrial processes so thoroughly poisoned land, water, and soil that the collective body would have designated them national sacrifice zones requiring generations of remediation—if remediation is even possible.
Shellmounds? Were these people even human?
Let’s pause, and reflect.
Eighty distinct cultures. Eighty different languages. Eighty different cosmologies, kinship structures, ceremonial calendars, ways of knowing. Not one people with one answer—eighty peoples with eighty answers, none of which required a prison, a landfill, or a Superfund site.
This is the part that is almost impossible to hold in the mind.
Dōgen’s monastery is a monoculture: an island of shared language and isolated cultural identity. The colonial project is a monoculture: a multivalent operation of power, subjugation, and extraction at industrial scale. Both operating from the assumption that there is one correct way, transmissible as doctrine, applicable universally, independent of place.
The eighty cultures of California suggest something the monastery and the colonial project both missed: that diversity of approach, held within shared relationship to place, is itself the technology of leave-no-trace. Not one answer refined to perfection—many answers, in conversation with one another and with the land. The oak savanna is not a monoculture. Its stability is a product of the diversity of its understory.
California today is one of the most diverse places on earth—again, still, differently. The question the land is asking has not changed.
What is meant by leave-no-trace? What traces have we been asked to reflect on?
From where we are, in this present moment,
what would buddha do?
Where would dōgen go to dispense his kitchen wisdom?
Does one attempt to move a civilization whose legacy is prisons and superfund sites toward a gentler stewardship?
What of the legacy of 80 cultures, across millennia, who left behind healthy fisheries, and pastoral oak groves that supported a diverse ecology?
What is a buddhist, who devotes themselves to leaving no trace, to do?
Practice, like your head is on fire.
know what you’re doing
there’s no decolonization without dismantling the gender binary.

the intersectional person is the one who binds community—because they actually understand and empathize with everyone.
countries and communities who stigmatize nonbinary identity and orientation are doing white colonizers’ work: one-drop purity tests don’t build you up—they prove you’re not good enough.
if you’re judging someone for their nonconformity, just know that you’re doing the white colonizers’ work. no reason not to say it out loud.
happy pride!
The Hidden School Day
How Life Outside of School Shapes Childhood Education
Part 2 in a series. In my study of what works in the effort to serve children’s needs and help them to become happy and healthy adults, I take copious notes. I find it helpful, occasionally, to compile and summarize these notes into a narrative. Why? Because my brain saves all of these notes, and my conversations are built from them, but sometimes the conversations don’t last long enough to articulate the internal narrative I’m working from. This series is an attempt to share my internal narrative, and open it to peer review. I take my notes from memory, and almost never cite sources. That being said, I invite the reader to connect any of the points made here to existing research and share their conclusions. This is a conversation, not a dissertation.

The history of American education is usually told through its institutions—the schoolhouse, the curriculum, the policy. But for most of the past two and a half centuries, the school day occupied only a fraction of a child’s waking hours. What happened in the remaining hours was not a blank space, and not the same for every child. It also counts as education—in labor, in play, in hunger or comfort, in the rhythms of a household shaped by class, race, and economic circumstance. The school day has always had a shadow: longer, less legible, and distributed with the same radical inequality as everything else. What follows is an attempt to describe that shadow in the same fifty-year intervals as the institutional history it runs alongside.
This is not original scholarship: it’s simply an overview in a legible timeline to point out patterns that have been documented in depth elsewhere. It’s a way of opening my working premises to a wider conversation. Let it be a springboard to deeper inquiry, rather than a document of record.
1750–1800: Childhood as Labor
For the vast majority of children in colonial America, the question of what happened outside school was easily answered: work. The agricultural economy ran on the labor of everyone in a household old enough to be useful. Children were useful early. By six or seven, they were tending animals, hauling water, carding wool, minding younger siblings, and helping with whatever the season demanded. The school day, where it existed at all, was short—often only a few hours in the morning—and seasonal, structured around planting and harvest rather than a fixed calendar. A child might attend for a few months in winter when farm labor slackened and be pulled back to the fields before spring.
The school day for a boy of the gentry class looked entirely different. It was longer, held in a dedicated space, and governed by a curriculum that assumed leisure time for further study. Tutors supplemented formal schooling. Books were available at home. The afternoon hours that a farming child spent at labor, a wealthy child might spend in supervised reading, music practice, or what passed for recreational activity—riding, games of skill, the cultivated pastimes of a class that had purchased the right to prepare its sons for a station rather than deploy them as laborers.
For enslaved children, education in anything other than farm labor was forbidden. Their hours belonged entirely to the labor economy of the plantation. Play existed—ethnographic and autobiographical accounts document the games children made in stolen moments—but it was unauthorized, shadowed by the constant proximity of surveillance and violence. Indigenous children in mission settlements were similarly subject to regimented labor under the guise of civilizational education.
The journey to school, where school existed, was almost always on foot. Distance was a real barrier: rural families might live miles from the nearest schoolhouse, and in winter those miles were genuine obstacles. The children most likely to attend were those who lived nearest—which in most communities meant children of the more established families, since the poor tended to live at the margins.
The baseline: Childhood is labor for the majority. The school day is short and seasonal, fitted around agricultural need. Time outside school means more work, not less — except for the children of families wealthy enough to have purchased their children’s time.
Who benefited: Children of the gentry and merchant classes, whose non-school hours were structured around cultivation and leisure. Their childhoods had room in them.
Who was excluded: Farm children, working poor children, enslaved children, and Indigenous children under mission control, for whom the hours outside school were simply more hours of work, or were not theirs to direct at all.
1800–1850: The Mill Child and the Country Child
The early industrial period splits the picture further. In the expanding cities and mill towns of the Northeast, children as young as seven or eight entered factory work—the textile mills of Lowell and Lawrence, the print shops, the glass factories. The school day competed directly with the work day. Many families could not afford to send children to school at all; a child’s wages were a structural part of household budgets. Where children did attend school, they arrived already tired, often having worked early morning shifts before the schoolhouse opened, and left to work again in the afternoon.
The common school movement of this era, championed by Horace Mann and others, was partly a response to this reality—an argument that children needed time set aside for learning. But the reformers were also motivated by anxieties about what unsupervised working-class children did with unstructured time: they played in streets, joined gangs, and generally failed to develop the habits of industry and deference that a properly ordered republic required. The common school was partly a moral intervention into children’s time—a way of filling hours that might otherwise be filled unproductively.
For rural children across the country, childhood outside school still meant the farm. The school day remained short—typically four to six hours—and the school year, even where compulsory attendance laws were beginning to appear, was rarely more than a few months. Play was largely unstructured and took place outdoors: sledding, swimming, fishing, musical ring plays, games of chase and capture that children organized themselves without adult direction. This was not ‘organized unstructured time’ as we think of it today; it was simply that adults were busy and children were left to occupy themselves within the bounds of the property.
For children of wealthy families, the period outside school was increasingly formalized. Music lessons, dancing lessons, and supervised social occasions were the architecture of upper-class childhood. Summer was spent at a second property or a resort. The journey to school might involve a private carriage. Physical distance from school was not an obstacle; it was a marker of social status.
The baseline: The school day is lengthening slightly in urban areas but remains short and seasonally compressed. For working-class and mill children, hours outside school are working hours. For rural children, unstructured outdoor play is the norm. For the wealthy, non-school time is a curriculum of its own.
Who benefited: Children of comfortable rural and merchant families, who had access to unstructured play time, modest material comfort, and a household economy that didn’t depend on their labor.
Who was excluded: Mill and factory children, whose time outside the schoolhouse was largely absorbed by wage labor. Enslaved children. Indigenous children. The urban poor, whose street play was viewed with suspicion and increasingly subject to institutional intervention.
1850–1900: Streets, Fields, and the Factory Floor
By the second half of the nineteenth century, child labor is at its historical peak. The 1900 census—counting at the end of this period—found nearly two million children between ten and fifteen engaged in paid labor, a figure that undercounts younger workers and those in agriculture. In cities, children sold newspapers, shined shoes, worked in canneries and textile mills and coal mines. The school day, now more standardized at roughly six hours in urban public schools, sat in the middle of a much longer day that began before dawn and ended after dark for many working children.
Recess as a formal institution begins to appear in this period, but unevenly. Urban public schools in wealthier districts might have a paved yard and a structured break. Schools in poor neighborhoods had whatever outdoor space happened to be available, if any.
The physical journey to school was almost always on foot, often considerable distances. In rural areas, children might walk two to four miles each way. In cities, the walk passed through neighborhoods where the density of poverty was itself a lesson—in precarity, in the reality of disease, in the density of adult labor.
For the children of the wealthy, this period introduces something new: organized sport and supervised leisure as a class institution. The private school sporting culture—crew, baseball, track—begins to take shape at the prep school level, and trickles into the recreation of upper-class children generally. Summer camps begin to appear in the 1880s, initially as health retreats for urban children of means. The concept of a childhood structured around physical development and wholesome outdoor recreation is being invented—but invented specifically for and by the affluent.
The baseline: Child labor is at its peak. For millions of children, the school day is bracketed on both sides by paid work. Recess exists in wealthier schools; outdoor play is an improvised affair for the poor. The wealthy are inventing organized recreational childhood.
Who benefited: Children of the professional and owning classes, whose non-school hours are increasingly structured around health, sport, and social formation. Their childhood is being designed.
Who was excluded: Working children in mines, mills, canneries, and streets, for whom the hours outside school were the hours that fulfilled the family budget. Rural children who walked hours daily to attend school for a fraction of the year.
1900–1950: The Playground Movement and the Leisure Gap
The progressive era produces the first serious institutional attention to children’s time outside the classroom. The playground movement—led by reformers like Jane Addams and Joseph Lee—argues that unstructured street play is dangerous and that structured outdoor recreation is a democratic necessity. Cities begin building public playgrounds in working-class and immigrant neighborhoods, partly out of genuine concern for child welfare and partly as a form of social control: get children off the streets and into supervised spaces where their energies can be directed appropriately.
Compulsory attendance laws, now on the books in most states, extend the school day and the school year. By the 1920s, a six-to-seven hour school day with a fixed academic calendar is becoming the norm in urban schools. The school day is getting longer; the hours outside it are shrinking, at least in theory. In practice, poor and working-class children remained heavily engaged in household labor—caring for younger siblings, helping with domestic work, working in family businesses—while attending school in the time that remained.
The radio arrives in the 1920s and the after-school hours begin to take a new shape for middle-class families: a domestic, supervised, commercial leisure. Children’s programming fills the late afternoon. Consumption begins to organize childhood time in ways it never had before. This is largely a middle-class phenomenon; the poor listen where they can, but the new consumer childhood—snacks, toys, entertainment—belongs primarily to those with money to spend on it.
For Black children in the segregated South, the school year was often dramatically shorter than for white children—sometimes only three or four months—and the hours outside it were dominated by agricultural labor on a seasonal schedule that white landowners controlled. The gap between the childhood available to a white child in a northern suburb and a Black child in the rural South created a gap in what childhood itself meant to integration into society.
The baseline: The school day standardizes at six to seven hours. Playgrounds appear as institutional interventions into children’s time. Consumer leisure begins organizing middle-class childhood. For poor and Black children, time outside school remains dominated by labor, with wide regional disparities.
Who benefited: Middle-class white children in northern cities, who gain access to supervised playgrounds, consumer entertainment, and a lengthening period of structured childhood. Their afternoons are beginning to look like what we think of as childhood.
Who was excluded: Black children in the rural South, subject to truncated school years and heavy agricultural labor; immigrant and working-class children whose household economies still depended on their labor; children in overcrowded urban tenements with no access to outdoor play space.
1950–2000: The Suburban Afternoon and the Forgotten Child
The postwar period produces what many Americans still imagine when they picture a normal childhood: the suburban afternoon. School ends at three o’clock. Children walk or are driven home. The neighborhood is safe enough for unsupervised play; someone’s mother is usually around. Dinner at six. Television in the evening. This is the dominant image of mid-century American childhood—and it is the childhood of white suburban families, made possible by the GI Bill, federally subsidized highways, and housing policies that systematically excluded Black families from the neighborhoods where that afternoon was happening.
In cities, the picture is different. Urban public schools often lack the outdoor space of suburban ones. After-school hours in dense neighborhoods are spent on stoops, in streets, in apartments where multiple families share small units. For children of working mothers—a category growing rapidly through this period—the after-school hours can mean latchkey solitude, or the informal supervision of older siblings, or the streets.
The length of the school day remains roughly stable—six to seven hours—but what surrounds it begins to diverge sharply by class. Affluent families begin investing in after-school enrichment: music lessons, sports leagues, tutoring, summer programs. The infrastructure of organized childhood expands enormously in the 1970s and 1980s for families with money. Youth soccer leagues, swim teams, private music instruction, SAT prep courses—the non-school hours of wealthy children become as intentionally structured as the school hours, sometimes more so.
For poor children, the after-school hours are increasingly unsupervised and under-resourced. Public recreation programs are cut during the fiscal crises of the 1970s. Community centers close. The street remains, but the organized infrastructure of working-class neighborhood life—the settlement house, the church league, the union-sponsored recreation program—is fraying. The gap between what a wealthy child does from 3–6pm and what a poor child does in those same hours begins to compound into measurable outcome differences by high school.
Children arrive at school by bus, by car, and on foot—but increasingly, in wealthy districts, by car in the exclusive sense. The school run as a daily parental ritual is a product of this period. In poorer districts, the school bus (or public transit, or walking) remains the norm. The physical experience of getting to school—comfortable, supervised, door-to-door versus exposed, crowded, long—is itself a daily index of the broader divergence.
The baseline: The suburban afternoon becomes the idealized image of American childhood—and the reality for white middle-class families. Enrichment infrastructure expands dramatically for the affluent. Public recreation resources contract for the poor. The after-school hours become a second site of compounding inequality.
Who benefited: White suburban children, whose afternoons are safe, supervised, and increasingly enriched by organized extracurricular activity. Their non-school hours are an extension of their educational advantage.
Who was excluded: Urban and rural poor children, whose after-school hours are unsupervised and under-resourced; Black families systematically excluded from the suburban neighborhoods where the postwar childhood was being built; working-class children whose mothers’ labor left them alone after three o’clock.
With Change Comes Resistance: The Leisure Gap Widens (1970s–1990s and beyond)
As the institutional history of education produces its backlash—against busing, against equity funding, against the framing of school as a site of redistribution—the same dynamic plays out in the texture of children’s daily lives. When public recreation programs are cut, they are cut in the name of fiscal responsibility. When after-school programs lose funding, the loss is framed as an unfortunate necessity. The cumulative effect is that the public infrastructure of childhood—the commons of play, the shared recreational space, the after-school program that any child could attend—quietly contracts, and the private infrastructure of childhood expands to fill the gap, accessible only to those who can pay for it.
This is not accidental. The same political grammar that converts equity funding in schools into an unfair advantage converts public investment in children’s time into government overreach. The playground, the public pool, the after-school program—these are all, in the backlash framing, things that responsible families provide for themselves. Public provision is for families who failed to provide. The logic individualizes what is structurally produced, and then blames the individual for the structural outcome.
By the 1990s, the research literature on out-of-school time is documenting what is already obvious to anyone paying attention: children in poverty spend their after-school hours very differently from children with resources, and those differences compound across years into significant gaps in academic preparation, social-emotional development, and college readiness. The response is a wave of after-school program funding—21st Century Community Learning Centers, extended day initiatives—that partially addresses the gap while leaving the underlying inequality untouched.
2000–Present: Scheduled Childhood and the Unsupervised Hours
The contemporary period produces two childhoods in increasingly sharp relief. The first is the fully scheduled childhood of affluent families: school, then sports practice, then music lesson, then homework, then sleep—every hour accounted for, every activity selected for its developmental and resumé value. This childhood is exhausting and productive and deeply anxious. It is also, on the other hand, very good preparation for competitive college admission and the professional-managerial economy that follows.
The second childhood has no such schedule. It is the childhood of children whose families lack the money, time, or stability to organize their non-school hours. It is spent on phones, in front of screens, in apartments, or in neighborhoods where the outdoor infrastructure of play has been allowed to deteriorate. It is not necessarily an unhappy childhood—children are resourceful—but it is not building toward the same outcomes. The difference between these two childhoods, played out across millions of families, is one of the primary mechanisms by which inequality reproduces itself across generations while appearing to result from individual choices.
The school day has lengthened in many districts—particularly those serving high-poverty populations, where extended day programs have been implemented as an equity intervention. The journey to school has shifted: in urban areas, a growing number of children are driven rather than walking, reversing the pedestrian norm of earlier eras and further sorting children by the access their families have to a car and flexible time. Remote learning during COVID collapsed the boundary between school time and home time entirely—with consequences that followed the same distributional lines as everything else. Children with quiet space, adult supervision, and reliable broadband managed. Children without those things largely did not.
Play, as an unstructured and self-directed activity, is declining across class lines—but most sharply for the children who have historically relied on it most. Recess is being cut in schools under academic pressure. Outdoor play in neighborhoods is declining due to parental safety concerns that are partly real and partly a function of media-amplified fear. The physical and developmental consequences of this decline are well-documented and not evenly distributed.
The baseline: Two divergent childhoods separated by money. The affluent child’s non-school hours are maximally structured and developmentally intentional. The poor child’s hours are under-resourced and unsupervised. The school day is lengthening in high-poverty districts as a compensatory measure. Unstructured play is declining everywhere.
Who benefited: Children of wealthy families, whose after-school hours function as a second, private educational system. Their non-school time compounds their advantage.
Who was excluded: Children in poverty, whose unstructured hours are the most visible symptom of everything the public system declined to provide. Children in under-resourced neighborhoods where the infrastructure of play—the park, the pool, the after-school program—has been allowed to deteriorate.
The Through-Line
The history of what children do outside school is not separate from the history of school. It is the same history, told from the other side of the door. In every era, children who benefited most inside the school building also had the most outside it: more time, more space, more safety, more supervision, more materials, more adult attention, more room to be children rather than workers or caretakers or simply left alone. The children who benefited least inside the building had the least outside it. The gap between the two was not a gap in effort or aptitude—it was a gap in what the society was willing to organize and provide.
What the school can do is always bounded by what it cannot reach. The child who arrives hungry, exhausted from an unsafe commute, responsible for younger siblings, carrying the anxiety of household instability—that child is not starting from the same place as the child who arrives rested, fed, driven by a parent, and free from adult responsibility for the next seven hours. The school day measures from bell to bell. The field of education begins much earlier, and runs much later, and is shaped by forces the school rarely controls and almost never names.
A genuine alternative to this history would have to account for what happens outside the building—not as a supplementary concern, but as a structural one. The hours between 3—6pm are not separate from the school day. They are its extension.
adulting and its opposite
here’s the thing that’s so hard to reconcile as i move into the last third of my life:

as much as i appear to my peers to overshare about my inner life, i feel like a tentative teenager when i consider the world i thought i would find myself in as an adult human,
growing up as i did on the expressive output of people whose writing i resonated with:
walt whitman, a.a. milne, gertrude stein, e.e. cummings, countee cullen, langston hughes, henry miller, anaïs nin, julio cortázar, charles bukowski, james baldwin, jack kerouac, allen ginsberg, frank o’hara, kenzaburō ōe, anne sexton, sylvia plath, audre lorde, angela davis, maya angelou, david bowie, jim harrison, erica jong, jim carroll, eve babitz, kate bush, prince, kathy acker, dorothy allison.
the world was supposed to be more gay, more unmasked, more nuanced, more accepting of complexity, more nonbinary. we were supposed to have seen through the inhuman demands of industrial capitalism. we were supposed to find ourselves on the other side of the world we had inherited. we were supposed to have embraced obvious but nontraditional solutions. we were supposed to have found family in people willing to be authentically themselves.
we were supposed to not get mad when someone disrupted the narrative. we were supposed to welcome disruption of the narrative.
instead, we find ourselves beholden to the productivity cult, to getting-things-done, to apologizing for oversharing, to wondering how to monetize our downtime and create passive income, to figuring out how to remain relevant. to deciding how many dead children are a fair trade. to fitting our expressions into a platform, our visibility decided by an algorithm. to sidelining the skills we invested skin in when we were young. to surviving in this economy, in the richest country the world has ever known. to choosing whether it’s worth the effort to just be authentic.
what. the. fuck. happened?
and why is what i am doing considered oversharing, when i feel like i’m late to the game, and barely scratching the surface, just saying the things i think are supposed to be obvious?
do you feel me? am i an old mf, shouting at a cloud?
help me here.
to a young person questioning themselves
I’m 60Mf (that’s how I’ve been indicating a male-presenting femme-relating person). I’ve always known that I’m different on the inside, and I’m so glad that it is becoming normalized to express ourselves about the nuances of our experiences relative to gender.

I’ve also recently been diagnosed AuDHD, and that has really helped me understand a lot about myself. None of the labels around gender or sexual orientation have ever landed in a way that gave me a feeling of “yes! that’s me!” but the term neuroqueer feels really right, and bigender has been feeling close enough since i’ve tried it on.
I’ve learned that I was living fairly unmasked through my 20s, but became very high masking starting in my 30s until recently. the way that that relates to gender, for me, is that i experienced a lot of cultural acceptance around gender fluidity in the social circles i moved through in my teens and 20s, but then a couple of things happened. i feel there was a cultural shift in the 90s back to more binary norms, which has kind of continued to this day. But then also, moving into my 30s i felt a certain need to ‘grow up,’ and ‘get with the program,’ so i tried to become as consistent and legible as possible, if that makes sense. As someone who has always been recognized as being ‘different’ or ‘off,’ i think i just kind of minimized those parts of myself that i recognized would create friction. A lot of my masking behavior I chalked up to ‘adulting,’ and just thought it was what everyone my age had to do to survive. It was only after I found myself in burnout and sought diagnosis that i started to understand that what i thought was adulting was costing me a lot of energy and was totally draining me.
I wasn’t, by any means, trying to make myself into a heteronormative male—i’ve always had more women friends and felt fairly unsafe in male-oriented spaces—but i just wasn’t out and proud about my nuanced self, and in intimate relationships there has been a lot of effort devoted to responding to what I now know was me not matching the expectations that my partners brought with them about how a male partner was supposed to relate.
With the diagnosis, i have decided to unmask as much as is possible and practical, while still trying to read the room and pay attention to when it is to my advantage to kind of disappear into my appearance, if that makes sense, and just not challenge people’s perceptions of me too much. Choosing my battles.
But mostly, unmasking has been great for my mental and physical health, and for many of my relationships. And that speaks to one of the ways I’m not trans (one of my offspring is a trans adult, so there’s a relationship to how the terms are different within our culture, even though they’re arbitrary social constructs).
Even though I experience the world in both masculine and feminine ways, both through my internal perception and through others’ perceptions of me, it feels safer to me (i have a lot of issues around relational safety) to live in the body that i have and to allow my inner feelings to be what they are, and not interfere too much in trying to conform to any specific track. In practical terms, that means that i recognize that for me to be perceived as either heteronormatively male or female would require a great deal of masking, and that’s just not something i’m willing to do anymore. I’m fine with the contrasts and contradictions of having both things going on within me at any given time, and i’m more and more comfortable continuing to be myself even when i recognize that who i am is confusing to someone i’m interacting with.
The result, at least at the place I find myself, might be described as a precocious girl or young woman who presents as a rather salty older gentleman, who is attracted to feminine people, regardless of gender, and kind of put off by performative masculinity and the feminine counterpart it attracts. I respond to any pronouns—masc, femme, neutral, singular, or plural—at any given moment. I try to tread lightly through the busy world of public life, and be as rambunctious and outside the lines as i feel with my 2 or 3 trusted people. In that regard, I recognize the privilege of masculine presentation, in terms of safety, and don’t take it for granted. I wish i could give every woman i know the opportunity to wear a giant mansuit out in the world, and feel the safety that comes with that. I need to go cry for a minute. Be right back.
I know this has all been about me. That’s because, you being young, I feel a responsibility to model how a nonconforming person comfortable with themselves describes their experience of themselves, at least one version of that. I don’t want to give advice, because we all have to discover our own way. I hope that this has been helpful, and i just want to send all the hopes—that you experience deep relational safety with at least a couple of trusted people; that you experience ’enough’ relational safety to test the boundaries of who you see and feel yourself to be and how that person wants to present themselves; that you find fulfilling work that sustains you; and that if partnering is something that you want for yourself, that you find your way to people who see you and accept you as you see yourself.
Happy pride!